Vertical Privilege Escalation: HR Manager to Super Admin via Unguarded Login-Email Change
A SaaS HR platform let any non-admin HR Manager take over any Super Admin account by changing the target's login email and catching the password reset — no exploit beyond the product's own UI.
How it went
- hr_manager
- edit profile
- login_email
- password reset
- super_admin
TL;DR
A SaaS HR/HCM platform (name withheld) let any employee with the non-admin HR Manager role take over any Super Admin account in the tenant. The attack required no exploit beyond the platform's own UI: change the target's login email through the employee profile screen, trigger a password reset, and catch the reset link at the new address. No password, no confirmation, and no notification to the real account owner were required at any step. From there, the attacker has unrestricted Super Admin access — including the ability to impersonate any other account in the tenant, a capability the HR Manager role doesn't otherwise have.
Background
The platform splits permissions across a range of roles, with Super Admin sitting at the top and HR Manager well below it — a role meant for day-to-day personnel administration, not account security. The product documents and enforces a clear boundary here: "Only Administrators can grant Administrator access," and there's a runtime guard that explicitly blocks non-admins from assigning or unassigning admin roles.
That guard works as advertised. You cannot, as an HR Manager, flip someone's role to admin. But a role isn't the only thing that determines who controls an account — the login email does too. And the platform never asked whether editing that field should be subject to the same hierarchy.
The Vulnerability
The platform's employee-profile editing feature lets certain roles update colleagues' personal information — contact details, addresses, and other HR-relevant fields. Login email happened to be editable through the exact same interface, with no additional authorization check layered on top.
Critically, the platform does have a safeguard for email changes — just not here. If you try to change your own login email, the UI requires you to confirm your current password first. That control simply wasn't extended to cross-user edits. An HR Manager changing another employee's email — including a Super Admin's — hits no such gate. The harder, more sensitive case (modifying someone else's credentials) was left weaker than the easier one (modifying your own).
Once the email is changed, the password reset flow does exactly what you'd expect: it sends the reset link to whatever email is currently on file. It has no way of knowing that email was just rewritten by someone other than the account owner, seconds ago.
Steps to Reproduce
- Create an account — this automatically grants Super Admin, the default for a new org owner.
- Invite a second account to the organization and promote it to HR Manager.
- From the HR Manager account, open the employee profile editor for the Super Admin user. Notice it allows editing personal information for any user, including the Super Admin.
- Change the Super Admin's login email to an attacker-controlled address and submit.
- From the HR Manager account's admin view, trigger "Send password reset email" against the Super Admin's account.
- Check the attacker-controlled inbox — the password reset email for the Super Admin account arrives.
- Set a new password and log in as the Super Admin.
At this point the attacker has full Super Admin access — notably including the ability to impersonate any other account in the tenant, a permission the HR Manager role was never granted directly. The privilege escalation is complete without ever touching a role field.
Impact
Security impact
- Complete vertical privilege escalation: HR Manager → Super Admin, with no role change involved anywhere in the chain.
- Full compromise of every Super Admin account in the tenant, one at a time, limited only by how many times an attacker wants to repeat the same two requests.
- Impersonation of any other account becomes possible post-takeover, exceeding what the HR Manager role is permitted to do even indirectly.
- Email-based 2FA, where enabled, provides no additional protection — the OTP goes to the same attacker-controlled address the password reset did.
Business impact
- Full exposure of company HR data: compensation, personal records, organizational structure — everything a Super Admin can reach.
- Complete bypass of a boundary the product documents and partially enforces ("Only Administrators can grant Administrator access"), undermining the trust model the platform sells to customers evaluating role-based access control.
Root cause
There was no privilege-hierarchy check on the login-email field at all. The platform correctly reasons about hierarchy when a role is being changed, but the same reasoning was never applied to the credential that actually determines account control. A user should never be able to edit the login email of an account with equal or higher privilege than their own — that's a general invariant, and this endpoint simply didn't implement it.
Why This Class of Bug Is Common
Access-control reviews tend to focus on the fields that obviously carry privilege — role assignments, permission flags, admin toggles — because those are the fields security testing is trained to look at first. But in most systems, privilege ultimately traces back to a handful of identity fields: login email, phone number, SSO identifier, recovery methods. Those fields rarely get the same hierarchy check, because on the surface they look like ordinary profile data rather than security-relevant data.
The result is a predictable pattern: a product enforces "who can touch roles" carefully, and completely forgets to ask "who can touch the credentials that control the account the role is attached to." If you can rewrite someone's login email, their role is irrelevant — you don't need to escalate their permissions, you just become them.
The general lesson: any field that participates in authentication or account recovery needs the same privilege-hierarchy enforcement as role fields do — editing another user's credentials should always require being strictly higher-privileged than them, with re-verification, regardless of which screen or endpoint exposes the edit.
Recommended Fixes
- Enforce a privilege-hierarchy check on every endpoint that can modify a login email (or any other authentication/recovery-relevant field): a user may only edit such fields on accounts at a strictly lower privilege level than their own.
- Require password confirmation or equivalent re-authentication for cross-user email changes, matching the control already enforced for self-service changes.
- Notify the old email address and require confirmation or a grace period before a login-email change takes effect — this alone would have broken the entire chain.
- Add a short cooldown on password-reset delivery immediately following any login-email change, as defense in depth against the same class of race.
Timeline
- Report submitted: October, 16 2026
Bug bounty report status showing duplicate to medium severity finding
- Disclosed here in anonymized form after the standard bug bounty disclosure process.